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United Kingdom
Our choices often require appropriate actions to obtain a preferred outcome, but the neural underpinnings that link decisionmaking and
action selection remain largely undetermined. Recent theories propose that action selection occurs simultaneously, i.e., parallel in time,
with the decision process. Specifically, it is thought that action selection in motor regions originates from a competitive process that is
gradually biased by evidence signals originating in other regions, such as those specialized in value computations. Biases reflecting the
evaluationof choiceoptions should thus emerge in themotor systembefore thedecisionprocess is complete.Using transcranialmagnetic
stimulation, we sought direct physiological evidence for this prediction by measuring changes in corticospinal excitability in human
motor cortex during value-based decisions.We found that excitability for chosen versus unchosen actions distinguishes the forthcoming
choice before completion of the decision process. Both excitability and reaction times varied as a function of the subjective value-
difference between chosen andunchosen actions, consistentwith this effect being value-driven. This relationshipwas not observed in the
absence of a decision. Our data provide novel evidence in humans that internally generated value-based decisions influence the compe-
tition between action representations inmotor cortex before the decision process is complete. This is incompatible withmodels of serial
processing of stimulus, decision, and action.
Introduction
Our decisions constantly require the selection of appropriate ac-
tions to obtain the outcomes we desire. The physiological mech-
anisms that transform decisions into actions, however, remain
largely unclear. Recent work provides insights into the formation
of action plans (Bastian et al., 2003; Romo et al., 2004; Bestmann
et al., 2008; Pastor-Bernier and Cisek, 2011) and suggests specific
roles for different prefrontal areas in guiding important aspects of
reward-based decisions (Daw et al., 2006; Kable and Glimcher,
2007; Boorman et al., 2009; Wunderlich et al., 2010; Noonan et
al., 2011). Surprisingly, however, there is still a substantial dis-
connect in our knowledge on how decision processes ultimately
influence activity inmotor cortex to select the appropriate action
(Freedman and Assad, 2011; Padoa-Schioppa, 2011).
While traditional views temporally segregate sensation, deci-
sion, and action (Flash and Hogan, 1985; Kawato et al., 1990;
Bhushan and Shadmehr, 1999), recent accounts suggest that de-
cision processes influence action selection via continuous up-
dates that occur simultaneously with the decision process
(Mumford, 1992; Cisek, 2006, 2007; Friston, 2008; Shadlen et al.,
2008; Cisek and Kalaska, 2010). Recent evidence indeed suggests
such an intimate temporal relationship between decisionmaking
and action selection. For example, decision evidence can be inte-
grated into an on-goingmovement plan (Resulaj et al., 2009) and
is conveyed through increases in effective connectivity between
decision and motor regions (Hare et al., 2011). Decision pro-
cesses bias sensorimotor regions beforemovement onset (Donner et
al., 2009) and these influences may be reflected in value signals in
(pre-)motor regions (Roesch and Olson, 2003; Gupta and Aron,
2011; Pastor-Bernier and Cisek, 2011; Sul et al., 2011).
Collectively, the above findings suggest that influences on ac-
tion representations in motor cortex should occur during the
period of decision making, but this prediction remains untested.
More specifically, it is predicted that such temporally parallel
influences on motor cortex trigger competition between alterna-
tive action representations (Cisek and Kalaska, 2010). This com-
petition is thought to be fuelled by evidence signals originating in
regions such as those specialized in value-computations, which
gradually bias activity of alternative action representations in
motor cortex. To date, it remains unclear whether the biasing
influences thus far observed inmotor cortex indeed occur during
decision processing, or instead reflect motor preparatory pro-
cesses that follow the decision. Addressing this question requires
a direct physiological read-out of competing action representa-
tions with high temporal precision, and the comparison of no-
choice and choice situations.
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To this end, we used transcranial
magnetic stimulation (TMS) in healthy
human participants to measure cortico-
spinal excitability (CSE) changes during
choice and forced choice trials of a value-
decision task. We found that on choice
trials, CSE distinguishes between chosen
and unchosen actions before the end of
the decision process, and reflects the value
difference between chosen and unchosen
actions. This provides novel electrophysi-
ological evidence that value-decisions bias




Sixteen healthy volunteers (11 female, 5 male;
age range, 19–31 years; mean age, 21.75 years)
with no history of neurological or psychiatric
disorder and with normal or corrected-to-
normal vision participated in the experiment,
with local ethics committee approval and in
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
All participants gavewritten informed consent.
One participant was excluded from the analy-
ses due to an insufficient number of trials (see
Data preprocessing and statistical analyses,
below).
Behavioral task
Participants performed a value-decision task with two types of trials,
choice (C) and forced choice (FC) trials. On choice trials (66%), partic-
ipants had to make a choice between two options that were presented to
the left and right of a central fixation point. Each option was associated
with a reward magnitude and a probability of obtaining this monetary
reward. Reward magnitudes were displayed as the length of a horizontal
bar; reward probabilities were shown as numbers (Fig. 1). The probabil-
ities of winning were independent across the two options. This meant
that on a given trial both, neither or one of the options could lead to a
reward. On forced choice trials (33%), only one option was presented,
which was either on the left or right of the fixation (with equal probabil-
ity), while the other side of the screen showed an X (“not an option”). In
both conditions, the chosen option was indicated via a button press with
the left or right index finger [maximum allowed reaction time (RT): 3 s].
The chosen option was highlighted (white border; 500 ms) and the out-
come signaled (green border: win; red border: no reward; 500 ms). The
cumulative winnings were updated after each trial by increasing a yellow
bar shown on top of the screen in proportion to the received reward
magnitude.
Participants were familiarized with the task during two training ses-
sions of 108 trials each. Themain part of the experiment consisted of four
experimental blocks of 144 trials each, resulting in a total of 576 trials
(384 choice and 192 forced choice trials). Participants were paid £12 for
their participation, plus an amount proportional to their winnings, with
a maximum of £2 per block. On average, participants earned £6.00 
0.06 on the task.
Reward probabilities (range: 0.2– 0.95) and magnitudes (range:
0 –2 pence) were chosen according to the following criteria: (1) right
and left hand choices had the same overall expected pay-off, (2) the
two reward magnitudes or probabilities offered on a given trial were
never identical, (3) the same combination of magnitudes and proba-
bilities was never repeated (i.e., every choice pair was novel), (4) the
majority of trials were hard in that one option was associated with a
higher magnitude but the alternative with a higher probability, and
the differences in expected values were 0.15, and (5) the offered
probabilities (pS1, pS2) and magnitudes (OS1, OS2), the chosen and
unchosen subjective probabilities [w(pch), w(punch)] and magnitudes
[v(Och), v(Ounch)], as well as the chosen and unchosen subjective
expected values [U(Sch), U(Sunch)] of choice trials were maximally
decorrelated (see below). Apart from these constraints, values were
randomly generated.
Correlations of the offered reward magnitudes and probabilities
were thus experimentally controlled and the average correlation for
the six pairwise comparisons between OS1, OS2, pS1, and pS2 was
0.027  0.018. To additionally minimize the correlation between
chosen and unchosen expected values, magnitudes, and probabilities,
we simulated participants’ choices using prospect theory according to
Equations 1–3 given below (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), with pa-
rameters   0.8,   4,   0.8 (Wu et al., 2011). We generated a
large number of stimulus sets and choices, and chose those sets that
minimized these correlations. This would later allow us to test sepa-
rately for correlations of our data with chosen and unchosen value,
magnitude, or probability. Participants’ actual choices led to simi-
lar correlations as the simulated choices, namely corr(v(Och),
v(Ounch)) 0.19 0.003, corr(w(pch),w(punch)) 0.27 0.03, and
corr(U(Sch),U(Sunch))  0.48  0.02.
The generation of probabilities and magnitudes ensured that par-
ticipants could not learn any stimulus-response or value-response
mappings. On a given trial, responses could not be prepared in ad-
vance of the presentation of the options and any motor preparation
should have resulted from an evaluation of the options presented.
This allowed us to investigate how the value-based decision process
influenced action selection.
Behavioral modeling
To infer the subjective values that participants placed on the options
offered on each trial, we used cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1992; Wu et al., 2011; Hunt et al., 2012) to estimate the
parameters for subjective distortions of probability and reward magni-
tude that best explained participant’s choices.
The expected utility U(S) of an option S  (p,O) with associated
probability, p, and reward outcome,O, is the product of subjective prob-
ability w(p) and subjective reward v(O): U(S) w(p)v(O).
Figure 1. Value-decision task and TMS procedure for reading out changes in corticospinal excitability. On choice trials (66%;
right) two options with associated reward probabilities andmagnitudes (bar length) were shown. Following a left or right button
press, the chosen optionwas highlighted (500ms) and the outcome signaled (green:win; red: no reward; 500ms). The cumulative
winnings were updated and displayed after each trial (yellow bar). On forced choice trials (33%; left) only one option was
presented. On every trial, a single TMS pulse was applied to left M1 hand between trial start and response. On FC trials, TMS was
applied between 10% (t1) and 80% (t6) of participants’ individual mean FC reaction time (FC-RT). On C trials, time points t2–t6
covered the decision period, starting at 45% of FC-RT and extending over the additional processing time required for the value-
based decision process on C trials (RT). Motor-evoked potentials were recorded from the right first dorsal interosseous muscle,
providing a direct read-out of muscle-specific corticospinal excitability at the time of stimulation.
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The value function v characterizes the distortion of information about
the reward outcome O,
vO  O, O  0 (1)
and the probability-weighting functionwmodels the distortion of prob-
ability information. It usually has an inverse S-shape characteristic, with
an overweighting of small, and underweighting of large probabilities
w p 
p
 p  1  p	1/y
, 0  p  1. (2)
Let S1 and S2 be the two options offered on a given trial, then the prob-
ability that the participant chooses S1 is given by the softmax function
pS1 
1
1  exp ((U(S1)  U(S2)))
. (3)
The temperature  determines the steepness of the softmax function,
i.e., how sensitive the choice probability is to differences in subjective
value between S1 and S2. For each subject, we thus fitted three pa-
rameters (, , ) using a maximum log-likelihood estimation in
Matlab (Mathworks).
Reading out changes in corticospinal
excitability during decision processing
We used single pulses of TMS to read-out
changes in CSE in the period between the
presentation of the options and the actual
response, as indicated via a button press. Pre-
vious work has used single-pulse TMS to investi-
gate changes in CSE during action preparation
(Mars et al., 2007; van Elswijk et al., 2007; Best-
mann et al., 2008; Duque and Ivry, 2009; Duque
et al., 2010). This procedure was adapted to ad-
dress how CSE changes evolve over the course of
a value-decision process.
Participants rested their head on a chinrest
to reduce head motion and wore a tight-fitting
bathing cap on which the optimal site for stimu-
lation of the right first dorsal interosseous (FDI)
muscle was marked. On every trial, a single TMS
pulse was delivered to the left motor cortex
through a 50 mm figure-of-eight-shaped coil
connected to a monophasic Magstim 2002 stim-
ulator (Magstim). The coil intensitywas adjusted
to elicit amotor-evokedpotential (MEP)of
1.5
mV in the right FDI muscle at rest. The coil was
held tangentially to the skull with the handle ori-
ented posteriorly at 
45° from the midsagittal
axis. ThemeanTMSpulse intensitywas 53 2%
of themaximumstimulator output. Electromyo-
graphic (EMG) responses were recorded from
the right FDI usingAg-AgCl surface electrodes in
a tendon-belly montage. The EMG signal was
sampled at 1000 Hz, bandpass filtered between 3
and 3000 Hz with an additional 50 Hz notch fil-
ter, fed into a CED 1902 signal conditioner, digi-
tized using a CED micro 1401 Mk.II A/D
converter, and storedonaPCrunningSpike2 (all
fromCambridge Electronic Design).
The critical question in this experiment was
whether biases reflecting the evaluation of
choice options emerge in the motor system be-
fore the decision process is complete. We
thereforemeasured changes in CSE at different
times in a trial to compare the temporal evolu-
tion of CSE between C and FC trials. On every
trial, TMS was applied at one of six different
time points, spaced between trial onset and response. These times were
adjusted for each individual, based on the RTs of the C or FC condition
measured in the second training session (see below for the validity of this
approach). On FC trials, the TMS times (t1–t6) corresponded to 10%,
35%, 50%, 60%, 70%, and 80% of the participant’s individual mean
FC-RT, thus spanning the entire trial from onset to response (Fig. 1).
On C trials, the first time point, t1, was kept identical to FC trials (10%
ofmean FC-RT) to allow for a direct comparison of CSE between the two
conditions. This time point served as the baseline because it was too early
for any decision- or action-related process to be initiated. However,
rather than spreading the remaining five TMS time points equally across
the trial, they were specifically targeted to the period of a trial when the
decision process was most likely to take place.
In pilot data (data not shown), CSE for right hand (RH) and left hand
(LH) responses separated at
45% of the FC-RT. Given visual stimulus
processing should take at least as long on C compared with FC trials, we
thus expected relevant decision processes onC trials to start at the earliest
around that time. Therefore, t2 was set to 45% of the individual FC-RT.
Furthermore, the time required for the decision process will be reflected
in the RT difference between C and FC trials, RT (Fig. 1), which can
differ across participants. The TMS time points t2–t6 on choice trials were
therefore spaced equidistantly between 45% of the FC-RT and partici-
pant’s individual decision processing time, i.e., 45%FC-RT RT. For
the TMS time points, t3–t6, this corresponded to 45% FC-RT 
Figure2. Behavioral signatures of value-baseddecisions.a, GroupRT changes (mean SEM)over time for the first and second
training block and themain experiment, separately for choice and forced choice trials. The light gray line shows the group average
temporally smoothed across 15 trials. For each participant, the TMS delivery times used in themain experimentwere based on the
mean RTs from the second training block. These were consistent with the RTs observed in the main experiment, justifying the
choice of TMS time points. b, Significantly longer RTs for C versus FC trials provide an index for the additional processing time
required for value-based decisions (RT; mean SEM). Furthermore, on C trials, participants were faster for easy versus hard
choices (i.e., large vs small difference in subjective expected value). c, Model-estimated distortions of subjective probability and
magnitude for all participants show that participants overweight small and underweight large probabilities, as typically observed
(top left). The utility function is concave (bottom left). Themodel fits participants’ choices well (right; diagonal represents perfect
fit; mean SEM).
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0.25*RT (t3), 45%FC-RT 0.5*RT (t4), 45%FC-RT 0.75RT (t5),
45% FC-RT RT (t6).
All TMS delivery times used in themain experiment were based on the
average RTs of each participant measured in the second training session.
In pilot experiments, we had established that in our task, RTs become
stable after
100 trials of practice, i.e., toward the end of the first training
session. They remained stable from the beginning of the second training
session onwards. Indeed, average RTs did not differ between the second
training session and the main experiment (t test on mean RT in training
session 2 vs experiment: tC,14 0.20, pC 0.85; tFC,140.50, pFC
0.63; Fig. 2a). This demonstrates that the specific TMS times used in the
main experiment targeted the trial period we were most interested in.
Data preprocessing. EMG data were exported to Matlab and peak-to-
peak amplitudes of the TMS-evokedMEPmeasured for every trial. Small
(amplitude  0.12 mV) and outlier MEPs (Grubbs test, p  0.005) as
well as those from trials with precontraction in the target FDI muscle
(signal 0.1 mV in the 50 ms preceding the pulse) were discarded. The
remainingMEPs of each block were z-normalized to ensure comparabil-
ity across experimental blocks and to ensure that all participants were
given the sameweight in subsequent statistical analyses (Hasbroucq et al.,
1999; Burle et al., 2002; Davranche et al., 2007; van Elswijk et al., 2007;
van denWildenberg et al., 2010; Tandonnet et al., 2012). Note that in our
figures, we additionally show the corresponding average rawMEPvalues.
Trials in which participants responded prematurely (100 ms) or too
late (3000 ms) were excluded from the analyses. In one of 16 partici-
pants, 51% of trials had to be excluded based on these criteria and the
data were not further analyzed because of an insufficient number of trials
for each condition. On average, in all remaining participants, 14 2%of
trials were discarded (small MEP amplitude: 5%; outliers: 0.02%; pre-
contraction: 9%; premature/late response: 0.1%), leaving an average of
494  11 trials of a total of 576 for further analyses. We note that the
relatively high proportion of excluded trials with precontraction is due to
the fact that, because of the inherent variability in participants’ RTs, TMS
would sometimes occur immediately before, or even during the overt
response and therefore coincide with its corresponding burst in electro-
myographic activity.
Even though we carefully discarded any trials withmuscle precontrac-
tion in the target FDI muscle, the reported effects might potentially be
influenced by trials with precontraction levels that were not detected by
the above exclusion criterion. To rule out this possibility, we calculated
the root mean square (RMS) of the EMG signal in the 50 ms before the
TMS pulse (Mars et al., 2009), which reflects such subthreshold fluctua-
tions in the signal. Thismeasure, instead of theMEP amplitude, was then
subjected to all analyses and statistical tests reported for MEPs.
Stimulus-locked MEP analysis. In the first analysis, MEPs were aver-
aged according to the absolute time after trial onset at which TMS was
delivered (stimulus-locked) separately for RH and LH responses. This
corresponded exactly to the six TMS delivery points (Fig. 1; t1–t6). Be-
cause the six time points depended on individual RTs measured in the
second training block, absolute TMS times varied across participants, but
critically were comparable in relation to the RTs of each participant. In
the summary graph (Fig. 3a), the points on the x-axis therefore corre-
spond to the average time of TMS delivery across participants.
Response-lockedMEP analysis.To assess whether any difference in CSE
between chosen and unchosen actionsmight be observed on choice trials
during the decision process, and to reveal when a bias in CSE is observed
with respect to the actual response on a given trial, we conducted a
second analysis. Trials were now sorted according to the time between
the TMSpulse and the actual response (response-locked). By experimen-
tal design (Fig. 1), we sought to avoid applying TMS too close to the
response, but this could still occur on some trials with unexpectedly short
RTs. Therefore, all trials in which TMSwas delivered100ms before the
response (100 ms) were discarded, including those trials where TMS
was applied during or after the response (mean number of excluded
trials: 31  5). This avoided ramping effects (Evarts, 1966; Starr et al.,
1988; Leocani et al., 2000) but was also necessary because there was not
enough data available for robust averaging in this time range. Similarly,
we discarded trials in which TMS was delivered earlier than 100% of the
participant’s mean RT, before response (100%), separately for FC and
C (mean number of excluded trials: 40  3). This only excluded trials
with unusually long RTs (where TMS occurred very early with respect
to the reaction time of that trial). Thus, the distance of all TMS times
with respect to the response now ranged between [average RT] and
[100 ms].
To allow for averaging across participants, we normalized TMS
times with respect to the group mean RT, separately for C and FC
trials. To this end, we multiplied each trial’s TMS time by a constant
factor (Group mean RT)/(Participant mean RT) (range: 0.66–1.29
for C; 0.76–1.17 for FC). Consequently, TMS times for all partici-
pants with respect to the response now fell between [group RT] and
[
100 ms].
This procedure led to an almost continuous distribution of TMS
times, relative to the RT on a given trial, due to the inherent variability of
RTs across trials. We therefore discretized these data to allow for statis-
tical comparison and display of the CSE changes over time. Based on the
time between the TMS pulse and response, MEPs of choice trials were
grouped and averaged using equally spaced 60 ms bins with divisions at
[750,690,630,570,510,450,390,330,270,210]ms.
These bins were chosen such that the number of observations in each bin
were approximately matched (average: 12.44  0.83 MEPs) and such
that no time bin included less than five MEPs in any participant. Impor-
tantly, the choice of bins did not change our main conclusion.
It was critical that we used the same bins for the FC condition because
this enabled a direct comparison of the exact time at which a bias in CSE
between chosen and unchosen action representations can be observed.
Critically, it also allowed us to test whether the bias occurred earlier in C
comparedwith FC trials. This comparison had not previously beenmade
due to earlier experiments lacking a no-choice control condition when
reporting choice biases in motor regions (Donner et al., 2009). Here, the
same bins were used for FC trials, starting at 450 ms (before the re-
sponse) because overall RTs on FC trials were significantly shorter, and
thus the earlier bins did not contain any data. Altogether, we therefore
obtained 11 choice and six forced choice time points, which were num-
bered backwards according to their distance from the response (t11 to
t1 and t6 to t1; Fig. 3b).
CSE changes during the decision period: isolating the decision process.
The third andmost conservative analysis was performed using amuch
more stringent exclusion criterion for choice trials. Assuming a
strictly serial processing from sensation to action, one would expect
that action selection and specification will commence only once the
decision is complete. In this case, any difference in CSE between
chosen and unchosen actions would be trivially explained by pure
action selection and specification. However, one would then not ex-
pect any difference between (future) chosen and unchosen actions in
the period when the decision is being processed. We therefore now
excluded all trials in which TMS might have been applied at a time
when the decision process was already complete, thus ruling out any
contribution from the action selection and specification process. A
divergence between the CSE of chosen and unchosen actions in this
pure decision period would then provide evidence that action selec-
tion is influenced before the decision process is complete.
One can estimate the time necessary for action selection and specifi-
cation independent of the decision process from FC trials. Because FC
trials do not require a value-decision, the time of first CSE divergence,
relative to the timewhen the overt response ismade, provides an estimate
for the time necessary for action selection and specification. This assumes
that this time is comparable in C and FC trials. Following this logic,
excluding any MEPs on C trials that were recorded at a time when CSE
was biased on FC trials (going backwards from the response) conserva-
tively controls for simple action selection and specification, leaving only
those choice trials where TMS was applied during stimulus or decision
processing (for a graphic display of this procedure, see Fig. 4c).
To obtain the time atwhich a bias inCSE first occurs on FC trials, while
enabling comparison across trials with different RTs, the time of TMS
delivery was expressed as the percentage of a trial’s RT. Zero percent now
corresponded to trial start and 100% to the response. This showed that,
on FC trials, CSE first distinguished between chosen and unchosen ac-
tion at 38% of the FC-RT (Fig. 4a), and therefore indicates the time at
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which action selection processes start. For averaging, we chose the largest
number of equally sized bins that would still lead to at least five data
points per bin. This allowed for robust statistical comparisons. The time
at which the bias was first observed (38%) was approximately consistent
across other choices of bins.
Therefore the absolute time (in ms) that corresponded to the last 62%
(100  38%) of the FC-RT was regarded as the action selection period
and was discarded fromC trials in this conservative analysis; only if TMS
was applied before this cutoff time was the trial included in the analysis
(Fig. 4c). This was done for each participant based on their individual
mean FC-RT (from themain experiment). On average, 86 8 trials were
additionally excluded based on this criterion, leaving an overall number
of 409  16 trials (of 576). For display purposes, we rescaled the
remaining time of a given trial (i.e., RT 0.62*RTFC) to 100%. Thus,
the TMS time of each choice trial, i, was now expressed between
stimulus onset (0%) and the end of what we considered the decision
period TMS%,i TMSms,i/(RTms,i 0.62*RTFC). Data were averaged
across six equally large bins (Fig. 4b).
Relating value-difference to changes in CSE. We next assessed whether
CSE would be biased according to the evidence that a chosen action is
better than an unchosen alternative action. In other words, the strength
of the biasing influences motor cortex receives from regions processing
the decision should depend on how much more valuable the chosen
action is compared with its alternative. Thus, MEPs for an RH response
should be large when the value for the RH option is clearly larger than
that of the LHoption, but it should be smaller when the two options have
more similar values. In contrast, when the LH is chosen, MEPs from the
left hemisphere should be more suppressed the larger the difference in
value between LH and RH actions. In brief, there should be a positive
correlation between value-difference and MEP size for RH responses,
and a negative correlation between value-difference andMEP size for LH
responses.
To test this prediction, we used the modeled subjective values of each
participant to calculate the difference in value between the chosen and
unchosen options for each trial. This value-difference was then regressed
againstMEP size using a linear fit separately for RHandLH responses. To
maximize statistical power, this analysis included all MEPs for which a
bias was detectable in the stimulus-locked analysis (t2–t6; see Results,
below). Becausewrong choices are likely to be due to noise in the decision
process (Cisek, 2006), only those trials were included in which the sub-
jectively better option was chosen (average number of MEPs included in
this analysis: 107 5RH, 127 5 LH). The resulting slopes of all subjects
were subjected to a t test, again separately for RH and LH.
Statistical analysis
All statistical analyses of RTs and MEPs were performed using repeated-
measuresANOVAs and t tests; all t testswere two-sidedunless statedotherwise.
pvalues inthe figuresdenotecomparisons surviving conservativeBonferroni-
correction.pvalues in the figuresdenotecomparisons survivingconservative
Bonferroni-correction with ** (p 0.05/6 0.0083 for six, p 0.05/9
0.0056 for nine, and p  0.05/11  0.0045 for eleven comparisons), and
those significant at anuncorrectedp0.05with*.Whensphericity assump-
tions were violated, results are reported with Huynh-Feldt correction.
Results
Behavioral choices are guided by value
Reaction times were significantly longer for choice versus forced
choice trials (C: 809 33 ms, FC: 539 17 ms, t14 10.29, p
6.54e-08; Fig. 2b). The RT difference between C and FC trials,
RT, provided an estimate of the time required to make a value-
decision on choice trials in this task.
The behavioral model fits explained participants’ choices well
(Fig. 2c, right; Table 1). Consistent with the pattern typically
Figure 3. Value-based biased competition for action inM1 occurs during decision processing. a, Stimulus-locked analysis of changes in excitability across the six TMS time points (mean SEM
at mean TMS times). b, Response-locked analysis of the same data, where the final six bins before the response are identical for choice and forced choice. Analyses for a and b show premovement
CSE for both C and FC competitively increasing for the chosen and decreasing for the unchosen action. Crucially, this bias between alternative actions occurs earlier on C comparedwith FC trials, i.e.,
during the decision period (starting
510 ms before the response). MEPs are displayed as z-scores; additional axes indicate raw MEP sizes. **Comparisons surviving Bonferroni correction;
*uncorrected results. w.r.t., with respect to.
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reported (Wu et al., 2011; Hunt et al., 2012), we observed an
overweighting of small and underweighting of large probabilities
(Fig. 2c, top left), as well as a concave utility function (Fig. 2c,
bottom left). According to the model-estimated values, partici-
pants chose the subjectively more valuable option on 83 2% of
trials. Participants were also faster for easy versus hard choices
(i.e., large vs small difference in subjective expected values be-
tween the options; median split: easy: 759 30 ms, hard: 850
37 ms, t14 6.90, p 7.27 10
6; Fig. 2b). This confirmed that
action selection was governed by value-based decisions.
CSE distinguishes between chosen and unchosen actions
before the value-decision process is complete
To test whether activity in the motor system reflects the chosen
action during the decision process, single-pulse TMS was deliv-
ered to left M1 at one of six different time points (t1–t6; Fig. 1).
This provided a measure of the temporal evolution of CSE. Be-
cause TMS was applied to left M1, a RH button press will be
referred to as “chosen” (the stimulated hemispherewas the hemi-
sphere chosen to make the action), and a LH button press as
“unchosen” (left M1 was not used to perform the action).
A stimulus-locked analysis of changes in CSE revealed the
earliest time when a difference between the two alternative ac-
tions became evident. On both FC and C trials, excitability be-
tween chosen (RH) and unchosen (LH) actions diverged 
200
ms after trial onset and at least 300 ms before action (2 2 6
ANOVA with factors C/FC  hand  time: F(5,70) (hand 
time) 30.87, p 0.001, 	2 0.16; post hoc t test on RH vs LH:
pt1,C 0.2, pt1,FC 0.2; t2 to t6, all pC 0.02; pFC 0.02; Fig. 3a).
Excitability increased for the chosen and decreased for the un-
chosen actions (2 6 ANOVA with factors C/FC time, sepa-
rately for RH and LH: F3.9,54.2,RH (time)  9.06, 	RH
2  0.27,
pRH 0.001; F1.8,24.9,LH (time) 18.99,	LH
2  0.90; pLH 0.001;
post hoc t tests against t1 for RH: t3 to t6 all p 0.03; LH: t2 to t6 all
p 0.001), consistent with a competitive process that boosts the
chosen and suppresses the unchosen action representation. This
difference was stronger on FC trials (interaction C/FC hand
time: F(5,70) 13.08, p 0.001, 	
2 0.05; post hoc t test RH-LH
in C vs FC: t3 to t6 all p  3  10
3) where evidence for one
option was unambiguously provided and shorter RTs were ob-
served. But critically, this effect was also present on choice trials
Figure4. Analysisrestrictedtodecisionphaseconfirmsthatbiasoccursduringdecisionprocess.a,
MEPsonforcedchoicetrialswererescaledonthex-axis suchthat thetimeofTMSdelivery isexpressed
as percentage of the actual response time on that trial (0% trial start; 100%RT; stimulus- and
response-locked).This showsthat thebias inCSEbetweenchosenandunchosenactions firstoccursat
38%of the trial’sRT, information thatwasneeded for theanalysisofCSE shown inband illustrated in
c.b,Analysis forCtrials, inwhichanyeffectofpureactionselectionandspecificationwereruledoutby
excluding trials where TMSwas appliedwithin the range of significant FC bias. This provides further
evidence that thebiasbetween chosenversusunchosenactions emerges alreadyduring thedecision
process (1 estimated end of decision process). Note that the grey box illustrateswhich datawere
excludedfortheanalysisofCtrials inb, ratherthanshowinganexacttimingcorrespondencebetween
C and FC trials (FC trials did not have a decision period). c, Schematic illustration of the procedure for
rejectingCtrials in theanalysisofCSEchangesoccurringduringthedecisionprocessingtimeshownin
b. Red line denotes the mean FC RT, orange line shows the range of significant FC bias (last 62% of
meanFCRT),andblack linesshowRTsof four individualCtrials;dashedgray linesdenotesixTMStime
points. Any C trial on which TMSwas applied within the range of significant FC bias was rejected as
detailed for these exemplary trials on the right. **Comparisons survivingBonferroni correction; *un-
corrected results.
Table 1. Model-estimated parameters reflected in Figure 2c
  
s1 0.43 0.73 12.75
s2 0.27 0.68 11.73
s3 0.18 0.48 28.07
s4 0.11 0.71 16.00
s5 0.09 0.70 18.38
s6 0.12 0.53 32.20
s7 0.10 0.44 4.94
s8 0.24 0.64 19.98
s9 0.23 0.62 13.43
s10 0.11 0.67 14.14
s11 0.02 0.89 19.98
s12 0.51 1.17 15.97
s13 0.17 0.78 16.21
s14 0.22 0.60 30.42
s15 0.44 0.64 16.76
Mean 0.22 0.69 18.06
Median 0.18 0.67 16.21
SEM 0.04 0.04 1.89
Individual participants’ (s1–s15) parameter estimates obtained by fitting their choices with equations modeling
subjective distortions of reward probability () and magnitude (; cumulative prospect theory; see Materials and
Methods); is the temperature of the softmax function. Participants showed the typical pattern of underweighting
large and overweighting small reward probabilities ( 1; Fig. 2c). In addition, the value function was concave
( 1). Model-predicted choice probabilities approximated actual choice probabilities well (Fig. 2c).
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where evidence for one versus the other action resulted from the
value-decision process.
We note that on choice trials, we observed a trend forMEPs of
the chosen hand to decrease from t1 to t2 (p 0.06, t14 1.98),
after which they progressively increased. This may reflect a “hold
your horses” signal that has previously been described in situa-
tions of response conflict (Frank, 2006; Aron et al., 2007; Duque
and Ivry, 2009). Consistent with that idea, this trend was not
observed on FC trials (p 0.55). There is work to suggest that the
subthalamic nucleus may cause this initial suppression of CSE to
allow all information to be integrated before a choice is made
(Frank, 2006; Aron et al., 2007). This mechanism could co-occur
with that of biasing influences gradually building up toward the
choice. However, because our experiment was not specifically
designed to address this question, we refrain from further discus-
sion of this observation.
Importantly, the stimulus-locked analysis does not resolve
our main question of whether excitability differences between
chosen and unchosen actions emerged during the decision pro-
cess, rather than at the stage of action selection following com-
pletion of the decision. We tested this in two further analyses.
First, in a response-locked analysis, data were grouped according
to the distance between TMS pulse and response. Crucially, the
same time bins were used for averaging in the FC and C condi-
tions, which enabled a direct comparison of the time at which any
bias between action representations can first be observed. This
controlled for action selection and specification in the absence of
choice.
The response-locked analysis revealed a significant bias for
chosen versus unchosen actions starting
330 ms before the re-
sponse in FC trials, but this bias arose even earlier when a value-
based decision was required (
510ms before the response; 2 6
ANOVAC/FC time on the data for RH-LH at t6 to t1 shows
trend-wise interaction: F(2.5,35.1)  2.53, p  0.082, 	
2  0.014;
direct comparison ofC versus FC at t4: p 0.08; t tests RHvs LH
for C: t11 to t9, all pC  0.6; pt(8),C  0.058; pt(7),C  0.6;
pt(6),C 0.0024; pt(5),C 0.095; t4 to t1, all pC 0.004; FC:
t6 to t4, all pFC 0.1; t3 to t1, all pFC 0.001; Fig. 3b).Hence,
the competition among alternative actions on C trials started
earlier than would be expected if it merely reflected action selec-
tion following completion of the decision. This confirmed our
main hypothesis showing that activity in motor cortex distin-
guishes between chosen and unchosen actions before completion
of the decision process.
To verify this effect, we performed a third and more conser-
vative analysis in which we sought to isolate the decision period
while ruling out any contribution from the action selection and
specification process (see Materials and Methods, above).
The TMS time of FC trials was expressed as a percentage of the
individual trial’s RT. This revealed that excitability for chosen
and unchosen options diverged at
38%of the RT on FC trials—
and thus was present during the final 62% of the RT (Fig. 4a).
This was taken as an estimate for the time during which CSE
reflects action selection processes that are independent of a deci-
sion process.
To examine whether CSE distinguishes between chosen and
unchosen actions before the decision process is complete on
choice trials, we excluded choice trials in which TMS application
fell within the part of the trial corresponding to the final 62%
of the FC-RT (in absolute ms). Consequently, trials with fast
RTs, in which TMS occurred relatively close to the overt ac-
tion, were more likely to be discarded (Fig 4c); the exact cutoff
depended on each participant’s average FC-RT. We therefore
ruled out that an effect in CSE could have been trivially ex-
plained by pure action selection because TMSmight have been
applied at a time when the decision was already complete. On
all remaining trials, TMS should have occurred before or dur-
ing the decision process, but not after. Critically, after this
conservative correction, CSE could still distinguish between
chosen and unchosen actions (2  6 ANOVA: interaction
hand  time F(3.8,52.7)  5.6, p  0.001, 	
2  0.13; post hoc t
tests: pt4  0.004, pt5  0.014, pt6  0.004; Fig. 4b).
CSE correlates with subjective value-difference
A final analysis revealed that the CSE difference between chosen
and unchosen action representations was likely to be value-
driven, and thus reflected the evidence for the chosen versus the
unchosen action. Based on recent direct recordings from dorsal
premotor cortex in nonhuman primates (Pastor-Bernier and
Cisek, 2011), we predicted that excitability should correlate with
relative expected value, i.e., the difference in value between cho-
sen and unchosen options. We thus tested for a correlation be-
tween value-difference and CSE using the data from time points
t2–t6 shown in Figure 3a.
We found that CSE related to relative subjective value (value-
difference) separately for chosen and unchosen effectors. On
average, CSE of chosen actions correlated positively with
value-difference, and significantly more positively than CSE of
unchosen actions (average slope for RH: 0.7  0.25, t14  2.84,
p 0.007; average difference in slope RH vs LH: 1 0.35, t14
2.85, p 0.006; all t tests reported in this section are one-sided
because of our a priori hypotheses; Fig. 5). CSE of unchosen
actions showed a trend to correlate negatively with value-
difference (average slope:0.3 0.22, t141.38, p 0.094).
None of these effects were observedwhen considering the relative
differences between expected probability or expected magnitude
(all p 0.1). Effects were weaker when considering the absolute
subjective expected value, i.e., the value of just the chosen option
(p 0.27, p 0.08, and p 0.03 for the same three one-sided t
tests). This suggests that competition for action is relative and
depends on a weighting of current decision variables (here the
product of probability and magnitude). Thus, CSE reflects the
accumulated evidence for how much an action is worth taking
relative to its alternative.
Of note is that in all but two participants, we found an addi-
tional correlation between reaction times and value-difference
(all p  0.01 for both hands). This is expected because a faster
accumulation of decision evidence for large versus small value-
difference leads to faster reaction times (Fig. 2b). Consequently,
the correlation with CSE might have been driven by the decision
evidence (i.e., value-difference), increased action preparation
(i.e., shorter reaction times) resulting from larger value-
differences, or both. Restricting our analysis to the decision pe-
riod (Fig. 4b, shaded region) reduced the correlations between
value-difference and CSE (p  0.15 for RH, p  0.23 for LH),
though we note that in this analysis only 15% of choice trials
remained.
CSE changes during value-decisions are not caused by
muscle precontraction
Even though trials with muscle precontraction in the target mus-
cle were discarded from all analyses, we wanted to ensure that the
reported excitability effects were not caused by trials with sub-
threshold precontraction not detected by our exclusion criterion.
We therefore repeated all analyses and statistical tests reported
forMEPs on the RMS (seeMaterials andMethods, above). There
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was an effect of hand time and C/FC hand time (both p
0.001) in the ANOVA of the first nonconservative stimulus-
locked analysis (compare Fig. 3a), where TMS close to the re-
sponse was not conservatively controlled for. However, further
post hoc comparisons revealed that this effect was caused by a
significant difference in the RMS between chosen and unchosen
hand only at the last time point, t6. This could therefore not have
caused the very different effect in CSE observed at the earlier time
points. Furthermore, and most importantly, none of the other
more conservatively controlled effects reported for theMEP data
reached significance when performed on the RMS. This shows
that muscle precontraction was not driving any of the critical
reported MEP effects.
Discussion
Despite intensive research on the brain processes concerning ei-
ther decision making or the preparation and selection of actions,
it ismuch less clear how the two processes are linked and how our
decisions are transformed into actions (Freedman and Assad,
2011; Padoa-Schioppa, 2011). We investigated how decision
making informs the competitive process through which actions
are selected using corticospinal excitability measures from hu-
man motor cortex. We show that this competition arises during
the decision process and relates to the expected value of the ac-
tion. Our main findings are discussed in detail below.
Our data show thatCSEprogressively increased for the chosen
and decreased for the unchosen action, consistent with a compet-
itive process among alternative action representations (Cisek,
2006). Previous work has shown evidence for response competi-
tion at the level of human M1 for purely perceptual decisions
(Michelet et al., 2010) but it was unclear whether a similar mech-
anism can account for internally generated, subjectively moti-
vated actions such as those driven by expected values. Theory
predicts that alternative action representations will be boosted
(or suppressed) by the affordances guiding the selection of the
appropriate action (“affordance competition”) (Cisek, 2006),
whether perceptual or value-related (Basten et al., 2010). This is
of broader interest because it points toward similar physiological
principles for the selection of representations in perception and
action. Similar competition processes have previously been de-
scribed in the visual system (Desimone and Duncan, 1995).
Importantly, we observed that this competition between rep-
resentations of chosen and unchosen actions occurred parallel in
time with the value-based decision process, which was the main
hypothesis tested in this study. Recent models that unify action,
perception, and learning (Cisek, 2006; Cisek and Kalaska, 2010;
Friston et al., 2010) make exactly this prediction, and current
evidence indeed suggests an intimate temporal relationship be-
tween decision making and action selection (Donner et al., 2009;
Resulaj et al., 2009; Hare et al., 2011). However, direct evidence
supporting a simultaneous specification of actions during a deci-
sion process has thus far been lacking. It has not been directly
tested whether physiological changes in (pre-)motor regions be-
fore an action could not just simply reflect motor preparatory
processes that follow the decision.Herewe used a novel approach
that measured the temporal evolution of CSE during the course
of a trial using TMS, and compared this temporal evolution in a
choice and no-choice context. We provide evidence that CSE is
biased earlier, with respect to movement onset, in choice com-
pared with no-choice contexts. This indicates that the decision
process influences action selection via continuous updates, i.e.,
parallel in time with the decision process. The processing of de-
cision variables guiding behavior therefore immediately influ-
ences the specification of the resulting behavior. This contrasts
situations where decisions are abstract and thus not immediately
linked to any action (Wunderlich et al., 2010; Padoa-Schioppa,
2011).
It could be argued that the early diversion of CSE on choice
trials just reflects the beginning of action preparation and selec-
tion, which may take longer on choice compared with forced
choice trials. This is entirely consistent with our interpretation:
the CSE changes observed during the decision period on choice
trials are only functionally meaningful if they contribute to the
preparation and selection of the required action. These CSE
changes are thus the earliest expression ofmotor preparation, but
critically they are triggered by the underlying decision process
and reflect the currently available decision evidence. This is dif-
ferent from the effects of action preparation and selection ob-
served on forced choice trials, where the evidence for the
forthcoming action is unambiguous and does not require a time-
consuming decision process.
Our second finding suggests that CSE on choice trials changes
in relation to expected value. Converging evidence from work in
rodents and nonhuman primates indeed shows that variables
relevant for value-decisions influence activity in premotor areas
(Roesch and Olson, 2003; Pastor-Bernier and Cisek, 2011; Sul et
Figure5. CSE correlateswith relative expected value. Excitability (data from t2–t6 in Fig. 3a)
correlates positivelywith relative subjective expected value for chosenactions, and significantly
more positively for chosen versus unchosen actions. There is a trend for a negative correlation
with unchosen actions. a, Regression slopes for an exemplary participant. b, Group mean
slopes SEM (centered at 0).
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al., 2011). So far, this evidence has been lacking in humans (but
for a task where participants did not make choices, see Kapogi-
annis et al., 2008). Based on our current data, we speculate that
value-related signals can be observed from human CSE record-
ings during decisionmaking and reflect the influence of the value
computation that motivates behavior. However, in the present
case, both reaction times as well as CSE related to value-
difference, so that the respective contribution of these variables
remains to be determined. Nevertheless, we note that changes in
CSE were better explained by the value-difference between the
options as opposed to the absolute value chosen on a given trial.
The computation of a value-difference signal is critical for the
comparison of choice options and thus the ultimate decision
computation, and is thought to rely on specialized regions in
medial and lateral prefrontal cortex (Boorman et al., 2009;
Wunderlich et al., 2010; Hare et al., 2011; Hunt et al., 2012).
The presence of value signals in action representations re-
corded from motor cortex should however not be interpreted as
evidence that this region is concerned with the computation or
comparison of values. Instead, these signals are likely to reflect an
accumulation of evidence for a decision that is taking place else-
where. We speculate that the motor system has an active role in
action selection in the sense that it continuously predicts what the
most likely course of action will be, based on the evidence re-
ceived from other regions. Although not directly tested here, this
would be consistent with our data and current theory about hi-
erarchical dynamical models of brain function (Friston et al.,
2010).
The anatomical pathways via which decision evidence is
broadcast to motor and premotor cortices require further inves-
tigation. Decisions of hand choice, for example, have been shown
to rely on influences from posterior parietal cortex (Oliveira et
al., 2010). In contrast, perceptual decisions are likely to be driven
by evidence originating in regions such as intraparietal (Shadlen
and Newsome, 2001) and dorsolateral prefrontal (Heekeren et
al., 2004, 2006; Philiastides et al., 2011) cortices. For the compu-
tation of value signals, the relevant decision variable in our task,
several key brain regions have been identified (for review, see
Kable and Glimcher, 2009; Rangel and Hare, 2010). A likely can-
didate for exerting value-related influences on (pre-)motor re-
gions is the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) because of
its suggested role in value computation and comparisons
(Boorman et al., 2009; Hare et al., 2011). VMPFC has indirect
anatomical connections to motor cortices via the anterior cingu-
late sulcus (Dum and Strick, 1991; Price, 2005), or alternatively
via the ventral striatum, which can influence motor cortex via
frontostriatal loops (Middleton and Strick, 2000; Haber et al.,
2006). Other candidate regions are the lateral prefrontal and pa-
rietal cortices given their suggested role in the selection and im-
plementation of value-decisions (Kable and Glimcher, 2009;
Rangel and Hare, 2010).
The single-pulse TMS approach used here does not allow us to
identify whether the observed changes in CSE arise via cortico-
cortical or basal ganglia pathways, and future work will need to
examine the specific contributions from these regions during
decisions-for-actions. For example, Neubert et al. (2010) recently
used a combined double-coil and diffusion tensor imaging ap-
proach, showing that short-latency and longer latency influences
from inferior frontal gyrus/presupplementary motor area to M1
during action reprogramming were mediated by corticocortical
and subcortical pathways, respectively. Moreover, our approach
did not distinguish between the specific intracortical and spinal
contributions to the observed changes in CSE. Paired-pulse TMS
techniques can dissociate these (Kujirai et al., 1993) and further-
more help to identify the specific intracortical circuits mediating
the observed CSE effects. For example, different protocols can
identify excitability changes in intracortical GABAA and GABAB
circuits (Di Lazzaro et al., 1998, 2000, 2002). These could provide
selective targets for the value signals broadcast to motor cortex.
In conclusion, we have demonstrated that decision processes
influence the human motor system in a temporally parallel fash-
ion, consistent with recentmodels for decision and action (Cisek,
2006). We provide the first direct physiological evidence in hu-
mans that internally generated processes such as value-based de-
cisions shape our actions in a competitive and effector-specific
way even before the decision process is complete.
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